Faster and Cheaper
Reviving the Trans-Oceanic railway, Brazilian prosecutors sue BYD, new Confucius Institute in Honduras, and Arevalo's Taiwan travel plans. Plus: a closer look at Xi's CELAC speech
Welcome to Chaufa, a China-Western Hemisphere Newsletter by CPSI.
Today’s edition covers May 19 to June 2
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The Top 5 Stories:
The proposed Chinese-supported trans-Oceanic railway from Brazil to Peru continues to gain steam. In late May, the Peruvian finance minister hosted a meeting with the head of China’s railway administration and Brazil’s export promotion agency to discuss reviving the project. (Global Times)
First announced in 2015, the trans-oceanic railroad would connect South America’s Atlantic and Pacific ports via a rail line through Brazil, Peru, and possibly Bolivia. Though the very expensive idea has never gotten off the drawing board, U.S. coercion over the Panama Canal has likely renewed PRC companies’ and government officials’ interest in establishing an additional transit link to Atlantic-facing countries like Argentina and Brazil.
Brazilian prosecutors filed a lawsuit against BYD and two of its contractors for creating conditions “analogous to slavery” at their factory construction site. The Public Labor Prosecutor's Office is seeking 257 million Brazilian reais ($45.5 million) in damages from the companies.
In late 2024, Brazilian authorities shut down Jinjiang Construction Brazil’s construction of a new BYD electric vehicle plant in Bahia after it discovered the company’s employees were working in “slave-like” conditions. Reportedly, the workers lacked access to their passports, lived in sleeping facilities without mattresses or adequate restroom facilities, and had their wages regularly withheld.
A Confucius Institute opened at the Francisco Morazán National Pedagogical University (UPNFM) in Honduras. At the same time, UPNFM signed a cooperation agreement with the Zhejiang University of International Studies (ZISU) to establish student exchanges. Furthering education cooperation, the Central American country received unspecified “materials” from China to expand seven agricultural schools in the country, as well as a $100 million donation to support “education, infrastructure, [and] health” projects. (CGTN)
This is at least the fifth Confucius Institute in Central America,1 but it is the first such institute in Honduras. While these academic institutions are largely focused on promoting the Chinese language and culture, they serve as a valuable soft power tool in promoting a positive image of the PRC.
Canada joined seven other countries with non-official diplomatic relations with Taiwan in expressing support for the nation’s inclusion in the World Health Assembly. Belize and St. Vincent’s representatives to the WHA also voiced their support for Taiwan during the session, while Taiwan’s other diplomatic allies, namely Guatemala, Haiti, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, and Paraguay demonstrated their support for Taiwan by attending a separate hosted reception.
Taiwan was a non-state observer at the WHO’s World Health Assembly from 2009-2015, but ever since the DPP returned to head Taiwan’s government in 2016, Taipei has been banned from formally attending the gathering. While returning to the assembly is highly unlikely in the near term, Taiwan has made returning to the assembly a priority by rallying diplomatic support from friendly countries.
In a show of support for the ROC, Guatemala announced President Arevalo will travel to Taiwan (and Japan) in June. The trip will reportedly focus on advancing “bilateral projects related to Guatemala’s technology development.”
When President Arevalo was first elected, there was some initial speculation that his government might seek to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing in a bid to attract Chinese trade and investment. This visit will likely quell those concerns, at least in the short term.
Core Brief
Xi just isn’t the same: President Xi’s CELAC speech shows how China isn’t just focused on commercial ties
In early May, Beijing hosted heads of state, foreign ministers, and other representatives from nearly every Latin America and the Caribbean country. As discussed in Chaufa’s last issue, the IV China-CELAC ministerial’s joint declaration shows that the ministerial was a comparatively notable affair, with high-level representation and significant deliverables.
Aside from the joint declarations that I analyzed last time, the summit also featured a notable speech from President Xi. Unlike the declaration, which (at least in theory) reflects the joint priorities and aspirations of both China and the LAC attendees, this speech articulates China’s perspective on its regional priorities.
Admittedly, Xi’s speech is full of platitudes and vague pronouncements. But when compared to previous major speeches on China-LAC ties to regional leaders, Xi’s speech not only shows how the way PRC officials talk about cross-Pacific ties has changed, but also how China’s priorities and future agenda have shifted from narrow economic concerns to broader social, political, and security cooperation.
What Xi used to focus on
Xi has delivered countless speeches and comments in the past decade that touch on policies that impact China-LAC relations. For the sake of simplicity, I want to largely focus on two previous addresses: the 2014 speech at the China-Latin American and Caribbean Countries Leaders’ Meeting in Brasilia and the 2015 speech at the Opening Ceremony of the First Ministerial Meeting of the China-CELAC Forum in Beijing.2
The former was one of Xi’s most important policy statements on China-LAC ties, with him introducing the 1+3+6 formula that put trade, investment, and finance at the heart of the China-LAC relationship. During the speech, he also touched on each side respecting the other’s “core interests,” promoting people-to-people exchanges,3 multilateral collaboration through institutions like the UN, G20, and APEC, and strengthening bilateral ties through initiatives like the China-CELAC forum. But he spent nearly as many words describing economic ties as he did on these other four priority areas.4
In the 2015 speech, Xi also identified commercial ties and supporting LAC’s economic development as the relationship’s central driver. For example, at the end of the address, Xi offered two ways for China to help the region. One was a vague promise of “an independent foreign policy of peace.” The other was China’s outlook for a “medium to high rate of growth,” which he suggested would lead to very specific trade, investment, and tourism outcomes. Of the two, it was only the latter economic-focused promise that wasn’t just filled with vague platitudes.
What was new in the 2025 speech
This year’s speech had three main differences: a specific connection between the PRC’s One-China Policy and regional sovereignty concerns, contextualizing China-LAC relations by not-so-subtly criticizing the United States, and dramatically expanding the specific priority areas of bilateral cooperation.5
Taiwan and “National Sovereignty”
This year’s comments on “safeguarding sovereignty and independence, and opposing external interference” went much further than previous years by specifically linking the PRC’s desire to take over Taiwan with LAC’s historic sovereignty issues.
In the past, Xi touched on China and LAC countries minding their own business by “following the path of development suited to their national conditions.” Highlighting the PRC’s support for Panama gaining control of its canal in the 1970s, the region’s “campaign for 200-nautical-mile maritime rights,” and China’s opposition to the U.S.’s Cuban embargo, this year Xi directly linked these regional sovereignty issues to his desire to control Taiwan by mentioning the One China Principle by name.
While it is common practice for Chinese diplomats to connect the One China Principle to local LAC sovereignty issues, Xi’s explicit connection elevates the importance of China’s Taiwan concerns in a region that hosts seven of Taiwan’s formal diplomatic partners (as well as seven countries with non-official Taiwan missions).
Criticizing the United States
The second issue, criticizing “tariff wars”, “hegemonism”, and “unilateralism and protectionism” in a not-so-subtle dig at the Trump Administration, shows how the Chinese side is increasingly unconcerned about competition with the United States. In the past, the closest Xi came to criticizing the United States was by implicitly suggesting that the international order was insufficiently “just and fair.” By and large, Xi’s previous speeches solely focused on what China prioritized and offered to the region, rather than contrasting the PRC with LAC’s northern neighbor.
This time, Xi dedicated an entire paragraph in the middle of the address criticizing the United States. Aside from a dig on the U.S.’s Cuban embargo, he refrained from explicitly mentioning Washington or Trump in his speech by name. But his references to “geopolitical and bloc confrontation and the surging tide of unilateralism and protectionism,” “tariff wars or trade wars,” and “bullying or hegemonism” were a not-so-subtle refutation of the Trump administration and Washington’s broader policy trajectory. As the current U.S. administration prioritizes competition with China in the region, Xi’s speech suggests that his country plans to lean in, rather than back down, from a contest or conflict.
New areas of collaboration
Just like the China-CELAC declaration, Xi highlighted issues that he had never previously raised in one of these all-encompassing speeches.
One issue set that he never previously addressed was China’s support for natural disasters and pandemic relief in the region. Xi spent a whole paragraph on the issue, naming earthquake and hurricane response, as well as supplying medical teams, medical supplies, and vaccines as one of the key areas of bilateral cooperation.
Another new area was security issues. Aside from cybersecurity (which was mentioned in 2014), Xi’s suggestion to collaborate in “disaster governance, cybersecurity, counterterrorism, anti-corruption, narcotics control and combating transnational organized crime” identified all new areas of engagement on peace and security matters.
Other new areas of collaboration included “civilizational” topics and cutting-edge technologies. On the former, Xi suggested collaboration in the arts and archeological projects, as well as “combatting illicit trafficking of cultural property.” On the latter, he noted clean energy, artificial intelligence, and the digital economy, all areas in which the Chinese economy is increasingly competitive.
While for the most part, China has long worked on many of these topics in the region (and Xi and his subordinates have mentioned these issues in other speeches), Xi’s choice to give these non-commercial issues just as much, if not more, weight than commercial topics in a broadly-focused speech shows that the China-LAC relationship is graduating beyond one driven by trade, finance, and investment.
Xi’s explicit deliverables
Similar to the structure of the 2014 address, Xi separated China’s engagement into five buckets. But unlike the earlier speech, the specific areas of cooperation highlighted across the five topics (international solidarity [political ties], economic development, civilizational exchanges, peace and security cooperation, and people-to-people ties) were much less focused on commercial engagement.6
For reference, the following list of deliverables sprinkled throughout the address (some of which have been previously reported, but others I have not seen highlighted as much):
Solidarity Program
Invite “300 members from political parties” to China each year7
Development Program
CN¥66 billion RMB (USD 9 billion) credit line
Expand cooperation in emerging areas such as clean energy, 5G telecommunications, the digital economy, and artificial intelligence
Carry out the China-LAC Science and Technology Partnership
Civilization Program
A Conference on China-LAC Inter-Civilizational Dialogue
A Latin American and Caribbean Arts Season
Joint archaeological projects, conservation and restoration of ancient and historic sites, and museum exhibitions
Combat illicit trafficking of cultural property
Peace Program
Organize law enforcement training programs
Provide law enforcement equipment assistance
People-to-People Connectivity Program
3,500 government scholarships, 10,000 training opportunities in China, 500 International Chinese Language Teachers Scholarships, 300 training opportunities for poverty reduction professionals, 1,000 Chinese Bridge-funded placements, 300 "small and beautiful" livelihood projects
Translate and introduce 10 premium TV dramas and audiovisual programs annually to each other
China-LAC Tourism Dialogue
Visa exemptions for five countries, with a promise to further expand visa exemptions into the future
What does this mean for the future of China-LAC ties?
Since President Xi’s trade, finance, and investment-focused speech at the China-LAC leaders’ summit in 2014, Chinese-LAC engagement has been a story of economic cooperation. From major infrastructure projects like the Port of Chancay in Peru, notable investments in countries like Mexico, and FTAs with countries like Ecuador and Nicaragua, the most eye-catching news stories about Chinese-LAC cooperation have almost always been commercial.
This year’s speech highlights that it is no longer the case that commercial ties are the driver of China-LAC relations.
Of course, this does not mean that economic ties are not important — Chinese companies, financial institutions, and government agencies will no doubt continue to deepen their trade, investment, and financing engagement with the region. But if Xi’s speech is any clue, over the next decade expect a broader range of Chinese state and non-state actors to raise the salience of China’s desire to take over Taiwan, explicitly criticize and compete with the United States, and expand China’s political, cultural, social, and security ties.
The Roundup
Politics and diplomacy
A close advisor to President Xi and Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Wang Huning, met with the President of Mexico’s Chamber of Deputies, Sergio Gutiérrez Luna, in Beijing. The two discussed enhancing parliamentary exchanges, boosting cultural cooperation, and deepening cooperation in infrastructure construction. (Xinhua) (China Daily)
Cuban Communist Party leader Beatriz Johnson sat down with the head of the CCP’s International Department Liu Jianchao to expand inter-party ties. Meanwhile, Cuba was one of the more than 30 countries to join China’s newly-established International Organization for Mediation in Hong Kong.
The organization seeks to provide an “alternative” to traditional arbitration mechanisms.
As part of her visit to China for the IV China-CELAC Forum, Ecuadorian Finance Minister Sariha Moya met with several major Chinese finance institutions, including CDB, China Ex-IM, ICBC, and the AIIB, to discuss financing new green energy and roadwork projects. At the same time, the head of an Ecuadorian exporters association held discussions with the Bank of China and Huawei on new technology cooperation opportunities.
Uruguay’s president and foreign minister welcomed a delegation led by the Vice Chair of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, with the two sides discussing enhancing diplomatic and trade ties.
Investment, finance, and infrastructure
Ecuador suspended four of Chinese firm Terraearth Resources S.A.’s mining concessions in Napo for failing to follow environmental regulations.
A Bolivian court ordered the immediate suspension of Chinese (and Russian) lithium contracts due to environmental and indigenous rights concerns.
The Chinese ambassador to El Salvador confirmed that Chinese companies are in talks with the Salvadorian government to build a metro system in the country. The ambassador also said that the PRC’s embassy has had a military attaché in the country since 2024.
Chinese Ambassador to Bogota Zhu Jingyang offered to provide new lines of finance to support Colombian infrastructure development if Washington followed through on its threats to veto multilateral bank financing to the country.
Despite previous pushback from Beijing, President of CK Hutchison Victor Li defended his company’s decision to sell its global port assets, including two ports in Panama, due to “geopolitical tensions.”
Chinese firm Yadea opened a $78 million electric motorcycle plant in Ocoyoacac, Mexico. Meanwhile, a delegation of business and government leaders from Hunan province discussed developing deeper business ties in Mexico City. (CGTN)
Guyanese Vice President Bharrat Jagdeo defended Chinese nationals working in the country’s construction sector, arguing that “the Chinese may be able to do it [build hotels and infrastructure] faster and, in some cases, cheaper.”
Ice cream firm Mixue will invest more than $600 million when expanding into Brazil, while Chinese automaker GAC announced it will build a hybrid and electric car factory in late 2026.
Trade and technology
ZIM shipping launched a new weekly direct sea route between Xiamen and three countries in South America (Chile, Ecuador, and Peru). The route will start with 11 ships per week, with a capacity of 4,000-5,000 containers.
During his visit to China for the IV China-CELAC Forum, Brazilian President Lula suggested that Chinese satellite companies could use his country’s Alcântara Space Center (CEA) for future launches.
Venezuelan Minister of Industry and Production Alex Saab hosted a Chinese delegation to discuss trade cooperation and joint development.
The Bolivian foreign minister signed a trade protocol on the sidelines of the IV China-CELAC forum with the PRC that will permit Bolivia bovine hide exports. Likewise, Uruguay signed a phytosanitary protocol to allow rapeseed and soy flour exports to China.
Due to the Trump Administration’s tariffs, Canadian seaborne crude oil exports to China surpassed exports to the United States. This in turn shows how U.S. trade policy is forcing some companies towards closer engagement with the PRC.
Taiwan
Paraguayan President Santiago Peña offered that his country could serve as a bridge between the United States and Taiwan, possibly by hosting a meeting between President Trump and Lai. Relatedly, Taiwan’s foreign minister suggested that Paraguay could act as a diplomatic bridge between Mercosur and the Asian island.
Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that later this year, the Asian country will permit Belizean white shrimp imports for the first time.
With support from the Taiwan Technical Mission, St. Lucia opened a new Digital Development Centre in Dennery North.
Taiwan donated $200,000 to the OECS’s Eastern Caribbean Solar Challenge, which will deploy solar panels in St. Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, and St Kitts and Nevis.
St. Vincent’s Unity Labour Party published an op-ed committing the country’s relationship with Taiwan.
Society and culture
A Colombian education institute signed an MOU with three Chinese universities to strengthen academic, scientific, and cultural exchanges between the two countries.
Dean of the Chinese University of Communication, Li Huailiang, met with the president of the Cuban Association of Journalists to discuss collaboration opportunities, including harnessing AI.
The Chinese embassy in Barbados donated $130,000 in medical supplies to the Queen Elizabeth Hospital (QEH).
In a press conference, Chinese Ambassador to the Bahamas Yan Jiarong said that a Hunan medical mission will provide free eye surgeries later this year. She also noted that her country will provide new grants to help with various projects in the country.
The People’s Daily featured a story on how a TV show set in Brazil was one of the first popular and widely-watched TV shows in China after reform and opening.
Analysis and Opinion
Speaking to AS/COA’s Latin America: In Focus podcast, Margaret Myers discussed “the shifting state of play in the U.S.-China competition, the Trump administration’s approach, and the view from Beijing to understand the changing picture for the region's leaders.”
Writing in The Diplomat, Nand Bardouille argued that Caribbean nations are feeling squeezed between the United States and China.
Guillaume Ptak wrote about how “from the Bahamas to Barbados, China’s footprint [in the Caribbean] is expanding through infrastructure, trade and diplomatic engagement” in the Washington Times.
That’s it for now, see you again in two weeks!
Make sure you don’t miss the next issue of Chaufa 👇
China had previously opened similar institutes at universities in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Panama.
Notably, he committed to China giving 6,000 scholarships, 6,000 training courses, 400 master’s degrees, 1,000 political party leaders visits, and a training program for 1,000 young leaders that reflects a similar commitment to his 2025 speech. However, it appears that these commitments were to be spread out over a 5-year time frame.
More specifically, he spent 472 words on economic engagement, while he spent about 609 words on the four other areas. That’s almost 44% of the specific content on commercial issues.
There’s another small difference that I didn’t have time to mention: Xi keeps pushing back the explicit historical links between China and LAC. In 2014, he historically situated the relationship between the PRC’s foundation in 1949 and China’s economic expansion post-2008. And while in 2018 he vaguely said that “our ancestors, braving waves of the vast ocean, blazed the trans-Pacific maritime Silk Road between China and LAC countries,” it was only in 2025 that Xi directly linked China’s and LAC’s relationship to the 16th century, explicitly citing a deep historic relationship between the two sides of the Pacific.
By the (admittedly unscientific) word count measure, Xi said 136 words on commercial-related proposals, while he spent 509 words on non-commercial issues. That means he only spent 21% of his specific proposal time on non-commercial issues, a more than 50% drop from 2014!
If the 2014 speech’s commitments were spread out over a 5-year timeframe (the text is a bit unclear), then this suggests an increased commitment to enhance political party exchanges.