Even 15,000KM Can't Keep Us Apart
The 4th China-CELAC Forum, Colombia joins the BRI, Rubio warns Caribbean leaders against PRC cooperation, and China evades Venezuela oil sanctions
Welcome to Chaufa, a China-Western Hemisphere Newsletter by CPSI.
Today’s edition covers May 5 to May 18
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The PRC hosted the fourth China-CELAC ministerial summit in Beijing on May 13. Dozens of Latin American and Caribbean leaders met with their Chinese counterparts to announce new investments (including $5 billion in new investments just in Brazil alone), a new $9.2 billion line of credit, new visa-free access for five countries (Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru and Uruguay), and a pledge to increase Chinese imports of LAC goods. The summit also produced a joint declaration and an action plan. Three Latin American presidents, namely Chilean President Boric, Colombian President Petro, and Brazilian President Lula, attended the summit in person.1 Notably, President Xi used his speech to criticize U.S. unilateralism and protectionism. Interestingly, representatives from two Taiwanese diplomatic partners, Haiti and St. Lucia, also attended the summit.2
Compared to years past, this year’s China-CELAC ministerial was fairly consequential. Though the intermittently held ministerial (which is typically held every 3 years or so) provides a good opportunity for the PRC to announce new initiatives in the region and build on existing bilateral relationships, the China-CELAC mechanism goes far beyond this tri-annual diplomatic exercise. Chinese state and party officials regularly meet with their LAC counterparts through smaller, issue-specific gatherings on topics like political party cooperation, science and technology, and agriculture.
Colombia officially joined the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), making it the 23rd LAC country to align with President Xi’s signature foreign policy initiative. Petro’s government later announced it would also join the BRICS-aligned New Development Bank. In retaliation, the U.S. State Department promised to “strongly oppose recent projects and upcoming disbursements” from the Inter-American Development Bank to Colombia. In particular, this could affect the bank’s funding for future parts of Bogota’s metro project, which might be built by Chinese firms.
Given Bogota’s historically close relationship with Washington, Colombia's joining the BRI is a big deal in symbolic terms. Although it is unlikely that the Andean country will receive substantially more financing or investment just because of the agreement, the deal tangibly highlights Colombia’s warmer ties to Beijing.
With Colombia joining the BRI, only three LAC countries (excluding Taiwan’s diplomatic partners) are left to join the initiative: the Bahamas, Brazil, and Mexico.
The Honduran secretaries of finance and energy led a delegation to China, where they discussed the Patuca II-A dam with the China International Development Cooperation Agency and signed two letters of intent: one on technology transfer with the Global Energy Interconnection Development and Cooperation Organization (GEIDCO), and another on strengthening commercial ties with the PRC Export-Import Bank (EXIM). The secretaries also discussed infrastructure project public tenders and concessional credits for climate-resilient infrastructure with Chinese companies.
Since Tegucigalpa established formal diplomatic relations with Beijing a few years ago, Sino-Honduran ties have been fast-tracked with major trade agreement negotiations, new infrastructure projects, and a notable presidential visit. However, some candidates in this year’s presidential contest have hinted that if they are elected, they would restart relations with Taiwan. Deepening investments and bilateral cooperation suggest that these political pledges are not deterring Chinese business engagement with the Central American country, at least for now.
U.S. Secretary of State Rubio told a group of leaders from the Bahamas and East Caribbean “to make responsible, transparent decisions when selecting vendors and contractors... ensuring they are not vulnerable to privacy and security risks and exploitation by Chinese actors.” This comes as a host of U.S. officials used their platforms this week to warn about Chinese influence:
U.S. Envoy to Latin America Claver-Carone admitted that he had told Argentine President Milei that “as long as Argentina has the [currency] swap with China, [it] will not be free.”
Ambassador to Guatemala Bradley argued that “using Chinese technology or doing business with that country carries a risk.”
Likely future ambassador to the Dominican Republic, Leah Francis Campos, said that she would “tirelessly” work to counter Chinese influence in the region.
Newly arrived ambassador in Panama City, Kevin Cabrera, called the PRC a “harmful influence” in Panama.
Core Brief
How the 4th China-CELAC ministerial compares to past years
There’s been a lot of great analysis on the results and implications so far – I particularly appreciated Tim Padgett’s WLRN article and this Atlantic Council Q&A. So, rather than talk about what the summit means or how it could impact future relations, I wanted to look backward to previous summits and how this ministerial compares.
Between the especially high-level participation and the notable and relatively specific policy commitments like visa-free access for five countries and $9.2 billion in financing, this ministerial appears to be a diplomatic win for the PRC. Yet with some governments refraining from letting their foreign ministers attend the event, the ministerial also highlighted the trouble a lot of countries are facing in balancing ties between Beijing and Washington.
A bit of context
Before this year’s conclave in Beijing, Chinese and LAC foreign ministers have met in this China-CELAC ministerial format three times: once virtually in 2021, once in Chile in 2018, and once in China in 2015.3
Typically, these forums last 1-2 days and feature discussions between the Chinese and CELAC members’ foreign ministers on a wide range of issues. This, in turn, usually leads to the publication of both a bland joint ministerial declaration signed by all the participants and a work statement that plans the next few years of China-CELAC engagement.
Who showed up
Understandably, some of the most attention was paid to the LAC heads of state who met with Xi and took the headlines at the summit. Yet contrary to one commenter’s suggestion that only having three presidents show up to the forum “shows both a weakness of CELAC & China”, having multiple presidents attend a CELAC forum is outside the norm.
Of the three previous summits, only the first ministerial in Beijing had any heads of state or government as regular participants. Back in 2015, Costa Rican President Solís, Venezuelan President Maduro, and Ecuadorian President Correa of Ecuador participated, as well as Bahamian Prime Minister Perry Christie, who attended the event. But in the 2nd and 3rd forums, the only heads of state or government that showed up were the hosts (Chile in 2018 and Mexico in 2021), and even then, they only appeared to give opening remarks.
Why the low attendance by heads of state? Well, this should be expected, given that China-CELAC is mostly a ministerial organization, and the highest-level meeting is a ministerial meeting. Unlike the African equivalent, FOCAC, it has never really featured head-of-state-level interactions.
Given this context, having three very different presidents, even if they are all from the left-leaning camp, shows China’s continued attractiveness and importance in the region.4 Really, the only person who appears to have skipped who probably could have attended was Argentine President Milei, who planned to originally visit in January for a tentatively-scheduled summit date but who ultimately sent a low-level envoy instead.
When it comes to foreign ministers in attendance, it appears to have been a mixed bag of mostly left-leaning countries. Countries ranging from Mexico to Cuba to Uruguay to Peru, as well as nine Caribbean countries, dispatched their foreign ministers. But it appears that some other governments that are trying to mollify Washington at the moment, like Panama or Argentina,5 sent a lower-level diplomatic representative instead.
What’d they talk about
At first glance, something titled the “Beijing Declaration of the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the China-CELAC Forum” would be a pretty dry and uninspiring document. And at first glance, you’d probably be right: like most summit-concluding statements, this one contains a lot of platitudes and vague promises.
As in past years, the summit declarations included a lot of backslapping, as well as vague commentary on the overlapping development trajectories of China and LAC and commitments to a multilateral rules-based international order. Yet when compared to previous declarations, the 4th China-CELAC summit declaration suggests there were some pretty massive changes in what was discussed at the summit (see here for the 2021, 2018, and 2015 declarations).
A lot of topics appeared for the first time in this document. Some topics, like AI governance and cybersecurity, Brazil’s Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty initiative, and China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI) and Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), reflect the newest policy issues and proposals.
Other issues, namely addressing Haiti’s political crisis, tackling transnational criminal organizations’ drug and human trafficking, combating terrorism, reforming the UN Security Council and global financial institutions,6 and affirming the One China Principle, are long-standing issues but were only mentioned in this document for the first time. This, in turn, reflects new priorities and areas of agreement in the China-LAC relationship, most of which reflect longstanding concerns of LAC countries.
The documents also highlight the deeper reach of Chinese diplomacy in the region. Like previous statements, the declaration recognizes Chinese cooperation with regional institutions like CAF and ECLAC. However, for the first time, the document notes the PRC’s connections with other regional organizations, namely Parlacen, Parlatino, FLASCO, and SELA. While these aren’t necessarily the most powerful organizations in the region, the references to these organizations certainly show China’s broader diplomatic reach compared to previous years.
The Roundup
Politics and diplomacy
President Xi met with Cuban President Díaz-Canel and Venezuelan President Maduro in Russia for the celebrations of the 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory over the Nazis. The Cubans largely discussed political cooperation in international affairs, while the Venezuelans also emphasized trade and energy. (FMPRC)
In early May, Uruguay opened a new consulate in Hong Kong expressly to promote new trade and investment opportunities.
A Chinese delegation headed by the Director of the Ministry of Housing’s Office of Inspection and Disciplinary Supervision traveled to Peru to discuss anti-corruption cooperation in the infrastructure sector.
Guatemala’s prosecutor accused President Arevalo of receiving a $13 million bribe in 2024 from a Chinese company to let the firm access a port on the Pacific coast.
China’s ambassador and deputy chief of mission in the Bahamas met with the new commissioner of the country’s police force to discuss police exchanges and to express “gratitude and appreciation to her for the quick solution to the shooting involving a Chinese citizen.” (MFA)
Investment, finance, and infrastructure
Due to the collapse of lithium prices, BYD and Tsingshan admitted that they will not go ahead with previously-announced projects to convert lithium carbonate into cathodes for batteries in Chile. However, the Chinese embassy later stated that the two firms were still interested in building lithium-related plants in the Andean country in the future.
A few days before the China-CELAC summit, Chinese companies, including Huawei, CCSI, and Yutong, signed four agreements with Nicaraguan government officials on communications, technology, transport and military weapons.
Ecuador’s state oil company signed a $105 million contract with Sinopec to produce an additional 12,000 barrels of oil a day in the provinces of Orellana and Sucumbíos.
A consortium led by CCCC and CHEC that is building the fourth bridge over the Panama Canal asked its local workforce to stop striking against the local government’s policies and “to resume their functions as soon as possible.”
A new $38 million multi-use community and government office building that was built by China Harbour Engineering Company was opened in St. Thomas, Jamaica.
During a meeting between China Three Gorges (CTG) and the Peruvian energy ministry, the Chinese company pledged to expand its renewable energy investments, including in electrification, hydropower, and green hydrogen works.
Trade and technology
MOFCOM Vice Minister Ren Hongbin led a Chinese business delegation to Argentina to explore agribusiness, energy, and transport opportunities. This comes as Chinese businesses continue to invest heavily in the country, with Fufeng Group planning to invest $400 million in a new corn processing plant in Santa Fe.
To circumvent U.S. sanctions, over the past 12 months, oil traders reportedly rebranded more than $1 billion of Venezuelan shipments to China as being sourced from Brazil.
Taiwan
The Taiwanese embassy in Belize facilitated a medical equipment donation from the Cao Zhong Zhi Foundation to the Caribbean country’s health and wellness ministry. Taiwan’s government also donated similar medical supplies to St. Kitts.
Taiwan’s ICDF helped launch a new white rice marketing project in southern Haiti.
St. Vincent and Taiwan co-hosted a forum on smart cities and cybersecurity. Remarks by Taiwanese officials focused on the country’s extensive CCTV system, which they claimed was essential for maintaining public safety. The two countries also announced a new $1.5 million initiative to support youth community involvement projects.
Society and culture
Journalists from the Cuban television channel Canal Caribe attended a seminar hosted by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce on improving telecommunications technology and news programming.
China’s Deputy Minister of Culture and Tourism traveled to Cusco and Lima to observe Peruvian culture and to share “good practices in the management and safeguarding of intangible cultural heritage.”
Analysis and Opinion
Tim Padgett wrote a great piece for WLRN on how “America is shocked to find it's playing catch-up with China on infrastructure, and influence, in the Americas. But little will change until President Trump chooses partnership over punishment.”
The Atlantic Council published a Q&A with its expert community on the outcomes of the China-CELAC ministerial, touching on issues like Colombia’s accession to the BRI, the diplomatic consequences of the summit, and the implications for the United States.
As part of Ryan Berg’s testimony to Congress, CSIS released new photographic evidence of Chinese signals intelligence collection stations in Cuba.7 The news prompted U.S. congressmen to request a comprehensive threat assessment on the bases from the homeland security department, while the Cuban government naturally denied the accusations.
Chinese Ambassador to Jamaica, Chen Daojiang, wrote a piece for the Jamaica Gleaner highlighting trade, people-to-people exchanges, and BRI infrastructure improvements on the occasion of the 4th China-CELAC ministerial.
Arturo McFields argued that “the US is crushing China in real time in the Americas” in The Hill, while Nand Bardouille wrote for The Diplomat that “China continues to mount a challenge to U.S. power and influence in the Caribbean Community bloc.”
A new piece by Evan Ellis in The Diplomat examines the challenges recently re-elected Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa will face in navigating a relationship with China.
That’s it for now, see you again in two weeks!
Make sure you don’t miss the next issue of Chaufa 👇
Argentine President Milei had previously suggested he would time a visit to China this year for the China-CELAC summit, but obviously, he didn’t show up. To symbolically distance his government from the PRC, he sent a low-level consul general instead of Argentina’s foreign minister. Furthermore, the consul-general left the ministerial early, which in turn meant that he did not sign onto the ministerial’s final declaration.
This doesn’t necessarily indicate a near-term flip in relations: Taiwan’s foreign ministry said that they were notified in advance about the two countries’ attendance and that relations remain “friendly and stable.”
There was notably a China-LAC leaders’ summit in 2014 that set up the China-CELAC institution, but because that technically predates China-CELAC, I won’t be discussing it here.
Moreover, the list of those who didn’t attend suggests that Beijing didn’t actually want to have to host a lot of heads of state. Maduro from Venezuela, Ortega from Nicaragua, Arce from Bolivia, and Castro from Honduras are all very close friends of the CCP, but obviously all of them sent foreign ministers to represent their countries. Only having a few widely-reputable presidents from fairly large countries suggests to me that China kept the high-level guest list to a minimum on purpose.
It seems some others, like Ecuador and El Salvador, also failed to send their foreign ministers, but I was unable to confirm a full list before this newsletter went out.
Funnily enough, China harnessed the non-committal language of a lot of countries’ One China Policies to “take note” of the Latin American and Caribbean desire to have another UN Secretary-General from the region. Given that China has to maintain a lot of other relationships throughout the world, it’s no wonder that the PRC didn’t want to commit itself to a policy that could hurt its relationship with other countries around the world.
To be a little persnickety for a moment, this testimony features one of the silliest literary references I’ve ever seen in a report. If you’re going to try to be credible about your open-source intelligence gathering, don’t quote a book like Our Man in Havana, which is famously about fraudulent intelligence and overstated threats! Moreover, don’t quote the part of the book that describes a non-existent threat in the Cuban countryside when trying to argue that there is a security threat in the Cuban countryside!