The Closest Friends
Taiwan's FM in the Caribbean, new econ agreements with Bolivia, Xi prepares to travel to Peru and Brazil. Plus: Trump's new Sec State on China-LAC ties.
Welcome to Chaufa, a China-Western Hemisphere Newsletter by CPSI.
Today’s edition covers October 28 to November 10.
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The Top 5 Stories:
Taiwanese Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung concluded his Caribbean Basin tour, ultimately visiting every Taiwanese diplomatic partner in the region except for Haiti. By and large, the visits focused on Taiwan’s foreign aid efforts and cultivating personal relationships with top political leaders. Last time I covered Lin’s trip to Guatemala, but the highlights from his Caribbean trip included:
In Belize, Lin celebrated 35 years of official ties and suggested that Belizean shrimp farmers would soon be able to export to the ROC.
Lin attended St. Vincent and the Grenadines’ 45th independence anniversary celebrations, as well as “the groundbreaking ceremony for an emergency and critical care hospital, the opening of agricultural training classroom and cold storage facility, and a plaque unveiling at a goat and sheep breeding facility”
In St. Lucia, the foreign minister met with the acting Governor-General and the Prime Minister, while the government unveiled a new collaboration with Taiwan on a health screening mobile app. The two sides later held a bilateral trade show.
The Prime Minister and Governor-General of St. Kitts and Nevis greeted the foreign minister on his trip, where they oversaw the inauguration of a new Chicken Breeder Farm and Hatchery facility at the Bayford’s Livestock Centre of Excellence.
China’s Deputy Minister of Commerce, Wang Shouwen, traveled to Bolivia to discuss investment, lithium industrialization, and possible Bolivian exports to the PRC with President Arce.
Bolivia’s trade representative also met with Wang to sign a (slightly inaccurately-named) “Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation” that will provide a $14.5 million donation for border control equipment.
President Xi will soon be visiting Peru and Brazil for the APEC and G20 summits, marking his first visit to the region since the pandemic. In addition to attending the summits, he’ll receive the honor of a state visit in both Lima and Brasilia.
These visits aren’t much of a surprise – they’d been announced months ago and are part of the routine global summit roadshow.
That said, expect a lot of hoopla about the new Chinese-built and operated Port of Chancay (which will be opened in the coming weeks), such as this article on Evan Ellis’s concerns. Just note that this project has been under construction for years and is intentionally being completed this month to make the biggest media splash possible for Xi’s visit.
China and El Salvador completed the second round of FTA negotiations earlier this month. The two sides started negotiations this spring.
The countries have reportedly already agreed to texts on “trade in goods, technical barriers to trade, temporary entry of people, competition, environment, cooperation in rules and dispute resolution.”
China already has FTAs with several LAC countries, namely: Nicaragua, Ecuador, Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica. Honduras is also in the midst of FTA negotiations, while Panama has recently expressed interest in restarting talks.
Canada’s industry minister forced TikTok to close down its offices responsible for “selling advertising and providing technical support and development for the app” in Vancouver and Toronto. The Chinese app will remain available in the country for now.
This comes as Canada’s signals intelligence agency said that China was the greatest state cyber threat to the North American nation.
From the PRC’s hostage-taking of the two Michaels to Chinese interference in Canada’s elections, Beijing and Ottawa have had a tense relationship over the past few years. This move will likely only further hurt bilateral relations.
Core Brief
What Trump’s potential new Secretary of State thinks about China-LAC
The New York Times is reporting that Trump will likely nominate Florida Senator Marco Rubio as his next Secretary of State. The son of Cuban immigrants, Rubio would be the first Latino in the role. Given the state he represents and his family’s background, it’s safe to say he has no shortage of thoughts about U.S. policy in the region.
Aside from his obvious disdain for Washington’s Latin American adversaries (namely Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela), Rubio would bring a long track record of worrying over China’s influence in LAC.
If he’s confirmed, expect Rubio to frequently travel to the region (including replicating Pompeo’s decision to travel to lesser-visited destinations for a Secretary of State, like Guyana and Suriname). On these trips, I’d be surprised if he doesn’t constantly frame the U.S. as in competition with China in the region and express support for Taiwan.
If he becomes Washington’s top diplomat, a few of his concerns that are likely to come up over and over again include:
PRC support for regional dictatorships
Rubio has complained about Cuba’s “long history of intelligence and military cooperation with the communist government of China,” and he warned way back in 2016 about Chinese signal intelligence bases on the island. He’s similarly castigated Chinese economic assistance for Venezuela and proposed sanctions on Chinese firms operating in the country.
Though significant rapprochement with most of these countries is probably unlikely, expect China’s influence to play a part in Washington’s tense ties with these dictatorships.
Sino-LAC commercial engagement
In the Senate, Rubio has held hearings and expressed concerns over Chinese commercial engagement across the region. This includes making the common (and largely unsubstantiated) accusation about PRC “debt-trap” diplomacy in infrastructure projects.
But he’s also made more specific warnings, such as this op-ed where he warns LAC countries against using advanced Chinese technologies, like Huawei’s 5G equipment, and encourages them to buy Western technologies instead.
When Rubio tours the region, expect a lot more talk about encouraging U.S. investment and trade in the region specifically to compete with similar Chinese projects.
China’s Mexico trade
With the “tariff man” back in power, expect a lot more hoopla about Chinese trade circumvention through Mexico. Just a couple of months ago, Rubio joined his colleagues in a letter calling for new trade actions on Mexican exports in part “to stop China from ‘exploiting’ the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement.”
Between the 2026 USMCA review, and concerns about Mexico’s democratic backsliding, migration, and drug trafficking, there’s more than enough on the U.S.-Mexico relationship’s plate. But with Rubio in charge in Foggy Bottom, Washington’s worries about Chinese investment and circumvention in Mexico certainly won’t be overlooked.
Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic partners
Rubio has been a stalwart supporter of Taiwan by calling the island a “strong ally of the United States” and by introducing multiple bills on U.S.-Taiwan ties, including “the Taiwan Relations Reinforcement Act, Taiwan Peace Through Strength Act, and a resolution commemorating 45 years of the Taiwan Relations Act.”
Furthermore, he was one of the authors of the TAIPEI Act, which “authorizes the State Department to downgrade U.S. relations with any government that takes adverse actions concerning Taiwan,” namely when a country flips recognition to Beijing.
As someone who wrote the bill1, Rubio will likely take full advantage of the TAIPEI Act’s provisions. If any of Taiwan’s seven remaining regional diplomatic partners or its seven unofficial partners kick out Taiwan’s diplomats, expect the United States to swiftly suspend foreign assistance or downgrade relations with that country. Moreover, Rubio may even try to encourage regional partners to establish new unofficial Taiwanese trade offices or even flip recognition back to Taipei.
A port? In a commercially strategic area? What will the Chinese think up next?
I’m sorry, but I simply can’t resist a silly quote. In a story about the new Peruvian port of Chancay this week, U.S. General Laura Richardson told the Financial Times that:
“If you look at all the countries which have these [Chinese] projects, they just happen to be around all these strategic . . . locations or sea lines of communication for global commerce... You have to ask yourself: ‘why all this investment in these kinds of things?’”
The remarks drew understandably some ridicule online. Without further harping, I just want to underscore that whether or not SOUTHCOM is legitimately concerned that the Port of Chancay is a security threat, making comments about how it is questionable that Chinese companies invest in commercially strategic areas doesn’t make their alarm bells credible.
Yes, Chinese companies certainly are influenced more by politics and the CCP’s political direction than most companies. But these companies are also just companies. And companies invest and try to make money! Sometimes a port investment is trying to capture a lucrative maritime commercial opportunity, and the failure of U.S. companies to invest in similar projects2 is a failure of U.S. industry, not a reflection of nefarious Chinese aims.
Ultimately, if SOUTHCOM wants to make the case that the Port of Chancay is some plot to undermine U.S. security in the Western Hemisphere, then it’s on U.S. officials to do more than hand-wave about the commercial importance of Peru’s coastline.
Raising alarm bells over Chinese companies making optimal economic decisions — all while U.S. companies fail to step up — undermines U.S. and SOUTHCOM’s credibility if a true threat to U.S. interests emerges. One of the Biden Administration’s best foreign policy decisions was to pre-empt Russian disinformation before Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, with U.S. intelligence. If or when SOUTHCOM has tangible evidence, they’ll need to be similarly specific and credible to convince the public. Otherwise, vague statements will make them seem like they’re just crying wolf.
The Roundup
“I was in Panama between 1979 and 1983 and I think I was one of the closest friends that General Omar Torrijos had, which allowed me to promote the arrival of many Chinese companies to that territory”
Former Chinese diplomat in Latin America Xu Yicong, per an interview
Politics and Security
Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, and Grenada joined 80 other countries in a statement calling for “respect of China’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity,” including a specific reference to China’s record on human rights and Xinjiang.
In cooperation with the Chinese embassy, the Ecuadorian National Police inaugurated its second Mandarin training course “to facilitate communication with Chinese residents.”
The governor of San Luis Potosí, Ricardo Gallardo, met with the PRC ambassador to discuss Chinese investment in the Mexican state, while China opened a new visa application service center in Mexico City in response to increased demand for visas to the PRC.
The Honduran Foreign Minister discussed sports cooperation, specifically through investing in new “first-level sports infrastructure,” with the Chinese Ambassador. Later, Ambassador Yu Bo sat down with the Minister of Defense to review “the progress of several projects.”
Zhao Leji, China's top legislator, talked with the President of the Cuban National Assembly, Esteban Lazo Hernández, in Beijing about political exchanges and the rule of law. (Xinhua)
Investment, infrastructure, and finance
The Brazilian Ministry of Communications (MCom) met with a delegation from China's National Data Administration signed an MOU on the “deployment of infrastructure and development of digital transformation, but also the Internet of Things (IoT) and new technologies.”
Panama’s President received the Chinese Ambassador in early November to discuss ways to increase PRC investment in the country, specifically focusing on: logistics and infrastructure sectors, renewable energy and green technology, tourism, real estate development, telecommunications, and agriculture.
Spanish firm Grenergy signed a strategic agreement with CATL. The Chinese battery company will supply batteries to the company’s solar project in the Atacama desert in Chile.
Trade and Technology
Shanghai hosted the 7th International Import Exhibition of China (ICIE), with numerous Latin American countries hosting pavilions, including Brazil, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, and Argentina. (People’s Daily)
Outgoing Uruguayan President Lacalle Pou admitted that his government had failed to convince Mercosur to earnestly pursue and achieve deeper trade ties with China.
After years of Sino-Canadian tensions, Air Canada will increase its number of flights to China, with a relaunched daily Vancouver-to-Beijing route and increased service to Shanghai.
Maduro’s Minister of National Trade discussed expanding access to cheap basic food items in Venezuela with the local Chamber of Commerce of Chinese Companies.
Taiwan
The head of the Paraguayan Senate visited Taipei, where he discussed Paraguay’s international support for Taiwan and technology cooperation with President Lai and the head of Taiwan’s legislature. The two sides also renewed a tourism agreement.
The Canadian House of Commons unanimously passed a resolution “stating that UN Resolution 2758 does not establish the People’s Republic China’s (PRC) sovereignty over Taiwan and has not determined Taiwan’s future participation in the UN.”
This resolution is part of a larger effort by Taiwan, the United States, and the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China to rebut China’s interpretation of Resolution 2758.
Taiwan and Guatemala announced several new cooperation projects, including “extension of the CA-09 North road, a specialized hospital for cancer patients, and support in medical technology for the improvement of maternal and child health.”
St. Vincent signed an MOU with the Taiwanese Overseas Engineering and Construction Company (OECC) for the Acute Referral Hospital at Arnos Vale project.
Culture and Society
China and Peru signed an agreement on educational cooperation, such as textbook donations and scholarships to study in the PRC. A related agreement on food safety was also signed.
The Cuban Minister of Public Health committed to enhancing public health, medical care, and medical technology cooperation with his Chinese counterpart.
The Chinese ambassador attended the opening of a new children’s play park in Grenada after the country donated about $100 to the park’s construction.
Yuan Longping High-Tech Agriculture Co. Ltd. held a “Hybrid Pepper Breeding, Seed Production and Cultivation Techniques” in Antigua and Barbuda.
Analysis and Opinion
Kirk Maltais argues in the Wall Street Journal that a new U.S.-China trade war could benefit Brazil’sagriculture exports.
The Ecuadorian newspaper La Hora argued that the Noboa government has not published any details about its economic minister’s trip to China because the visit did not produce any tangible economic benefits for the country. The article blamed the PRC’s lack of interest in providing new lines of finance to the region.
Lourdes Balconi Villaseñor wrote for the China Policy Observatory about the impact of Taiwanese Foreign Minister Lin’s recent visit to the Caribbean Basin.
Writing in the Financial Times, Christine Murray discusses a recent Rhodium report on how Chinese companies are increasingly using Mexico as an
Huynh Tam Sang and Truong Tuan Kiet argue in the Diplomat that “China’s economic power and internal politics among Taiwan’s Latin American and Caribbean allies” are hurting Taiwan’s chances to hold onto its diplomatic allies.
That’s it for now, see you again in two weeks!
Make sure you don’t miss the next issue of Chaufa 👇
Okay, I guess some staffer wrote the bill, but you get the point.