Don’t Tell Me What to Do
CCP-CELAC political parties forum; new infrastructure in Guyana, Suriname, Jamaica, and Cuba; Venezuela's VP visits Beijing
Welcome to Chaufa, a China-Western Hemisphere Newsletter by CPSI.
Today’s edition covers November 25 to December 16.
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The Top 5 Stories:
The Chinese Communist Party hosted the IV Forum of Political Parties through the China-CELAC Forum mechanism in Beijing on December 3. 120 delegates representing 100 political parties from 30 Latin American and Caribbean countries were in attendance, with the conference focused on both economic modernization and improving the “governance capacity” of political parties. (Xinhua)
Both the broad China-CELAC Forum and the party-specific Forum of Political Parties date back to 2015.
Chinese firms were awarded major infrastructure projects in the Caribbean over the past few weeks:
The Jamaican government selected controversial PRC firm China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) to work on the $319 million Shared Prosperity through Accelerated Improvement to our Road Network (SPARK) project that will rehabilitate 600 roads and lay down new pipes.
Guyana and Suriname chose China Road & Bridge Corporation to build a $236 million bridge over the Corentyne River to connect the two countries.
China and Cuba announced a deal to build seven new 5MW solar parks across six provinces to support the country’s weak energy grid.
That said, not everything is rosy for Chinese-built infrastructure. Trinidad and Tobago’s opposition alleged that the ANR Robinson airport expansion project, which is being built by China Railway Construction, is millions of dollars over budget.
U.S. President-elect Trump threatened a 25% tariff on Canadian and Mexican goods, as well as 10% tariff on Chinese goods, over his concerns about fentanyl trafficking and migration into the United States.
Partially in response to U.S. concerns, Mexican President Sheinbaum confirmed that Chinese EV firm BYD did not have any active manufacturing investments in the country. However, Sheinbaum then later defended Mexico’s growing trade relationship with China.
Paraguay kicked out a Chinese envoy to Latin America, Xu Wei, who had used a UNESCO meeting to meet with Paraguayan congressional leaders to try to convince them to flip relations from Taiwan to the PRC. Taiwan’s embassy denounced Xu, calling him an “infiltrator with an unknown purpose.”
At the same time, the two countries recently continued to strengthen ties, with the two sides signing a bilateral visa-exemption agreement, Taiwan donating 30 electric buses and four helicopters to Paraguay, and President Lai meeting with a delegation led by Paraguay’s foreign minister.
Vice President of Venezuela Delcy Rodríguez traveled to Beijing to sign an agreement on finance and energy with China's National Commission for Development and Reform and to meet with the PRC’s Deputy Premier. At the same time, President Maduro hosted a forum on the development of special economic zones with Chinese officials, while Venezuelan state airline, Conviasa, started a new route to Guangzhou.
Last September, Maduro traveled to Beijing to re-ignite ties between the two countries after several years of frustrated relations. While Beijing has largely held off on sponsoring new major infrastructure projects in the indebted country, it has repeatedly shown its willingness to back the authoritarian regime.
Core Brief
A Forum Suggests that the CCP isn’t Seeking to Spread its Model (For Now, At Least)
Earlier this month, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) hosted its largest yet forum of a hundred Latin American political parties in Beijing. These types of politically-focused events are always pretty notable, as they are a bit of a break from the more economic development issues that usually drive the China-LAC relationship.
For those concerned about whether the CCP will eventually try to export some of its authoritarian party-state model to other countries, the forum’s existence itself is worrying.1 But in a mildly reassuring sign, it appears (from its public language)2 that the CCP is not using the forum to double down on exporting its authoritarian party-state model to the region.
While party and state-strengthening activities were important at this forum – one article claimed that “reinforce the construction of political parties, raise their governance capacity” was one of two sub-themes for the event – the issue appears slightly less important than in previous forums. Rather, themes of global governance, economic development, and poverty alleviation were more frequently referenced in the post-forum declaration.
For background, the China-CELAC political parties forum is one of the earliest subject-specific forums in the China-CELAC system. Just months after the first headline China-CELAC ministerial, the first political party forum was held in December 2015 in Beijing with 27 political parties from 26 countries. Later fora in 2018 in Shenzhen and 20213 in Beijing were even more popular, with 80 parties at the former and 100 at the latter.4
Obviously for a forum on “political parties”, readouts and declarations from the events always at least mentioned the importance of political cooperation. In the first forum, the various political parties in attendance agreed that “exchanges... between the party cadres play a transcendent role in improving the organizational construction and capacity of the respective parties.”
The first forum also sought to increase these exchanges, saying that “it is important that we intensify to a greater extent the exchanges of experiences and reciprocal learning in everything that concerns the construction of party and the improvement of governance.”
The second forum, whose main theme was “Reform, Innovation and Party Construction,” marked a dramatic escalation in promoting party-to-party learning. The event was much more specific on the content of these exchanges, noting that “the rigorous discipline of the party is a fundamental guarantee for the vitality of political parties. Being leading forces of society, we have to integrally promote political, ideological, organizational, disciplinary construction.”
Coming off the heels of corruption purges in China, the declaration also notes that rigorous party discipline to “make our parties the backbone” of national governance should be enforced through “the fight against corruption, maintain the advanced and pure character of the party and closely linked to the people.” This type of strong language suggests at least some desire to export lessons from the CCP’s political system to the region.
By contrast, the fourth forum’s language on party-to-party learning seems to be more tolerant of different party-state relationships. Out of the declaration’s 10 points,5 only two of them mentioned state and party capacity building (the rest discussed economic development and international relations cooperation).
The first point addressed governing capacity regardless of the model of the political party, saying “political parties in China, Latin America and the Caribbean must strengthen their own construction in order to constantly increase government capacity.”
Meanwhile, the latter point reiterated previous declarations’ statements on the importance of inter-party exchanges regardless of regime type, noting that all sides should “establish institutionalized contacts and intensify political dialogue... to shape a new type of inter-party relations characterized by the search for common points above differences.”
It is certainly possible that any type of party-to-party exchange spreads the CCP’s ideas about how authoritarian party-state relationships ought to work. And this forum is not the only means the CCP has to spread political governance ideas, so analyzing these forums only provides one window into these types of political relationships.
But with all that said, the milder language in the fourth forum’s declaration at least suggests that the CCP is not6 seeking to widely proselytize its political model in LAC through this venue. Rather, the CCP (at least publicly) sees economic development and multilateral cooperation as more important than spreading its political model to a region with a long history of democracy.
The Roundup
Politics, society, and security
Cuban President Díaz-Canel met with the Vice President of the CCP’s Central Military Commission (the Chinese military) He Weidong, while former president Raul Castro sat down with the Chinese Minister for Public Security Wang Xiaohong.
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Alberto van Klaveren Stork, traveled to Beijing to meet with Foreign Minister Wang to discuss trade, investment, and multilateral cooperation. Stork also used the visit to sign protocols on meat and fruit exports. (Xinhua)
A Nicaraguan delegation traveled to Hubei to meet with local leaders and to discuss “twinning between provinces and cities, the strengthening of economic relations in strategic sectors, and the increase in educational, cultural, and artistic exchanges.”
Canada sanctioned eight former and current senior Chinese officials over Tibet, Xinjiang, and repression against Falun Gong followers, most (if not all) were already sanctioned by the United States. In response, China accused Canada of a “long history of human rights violations and numerous problems.”
The Vice President-elect of Uruguay met with the Chinese ambassador to discuss FTA negotiations and electric vehicles.
Mexican police seized over 150 million pesos of counterfeit goods from China and dismantled three Chinese companies as part of a broader operation. Similarly in Panama, police discovered two trucks of “smuggled medicines from China with false labelings.”
On behalf of the PRC’s State Administration for Market Regulation, Chinese Ambassador Guo signed an MOU with Guyana’s National Bureau of Standards on standards cooperation. (FMPRC) She subsequently retired from her position on December 10. Investment, infrastructure, and finance
Investment, finance, and infrastructure
The chair of a Surinamese presidential mining commission said that Chinese mining company Chinalco would invest $426 million in a bauxite mining project that will produce 6 million tons of bauxite anually.
Hong Kong CBC Investment Limited signed a contract with Bolivia to build two new “industrial complexes with direct lithium extraction (EDL) technology in the Uyuni salt flat.”
Nicaragua granted yet another mining concession to a Chinese firm, this time a 9,000-hectare plot about 300 km of Managua to Xinjiang Xinxin Mining Industry Company. Meanwhile, the country received a new fleet of 400 Chinese buses.
Chinese rubber processing machinery company Mesnac’s Hong Kong subsidiary announced it will invest $20 million in León, Mexico, for a new factory.
Honduras signed an MOU on green energy with PowerChina and the International Coalition for the Green Development of the Belt and Road (BRIGC).
China Harbor Engineering proposed an extension of Line 1 of the under-construction Bogotá metro in Colombia.
Trade and Technology
The PRC’s Optimize Integration Group (OIG) and the National Association of Aquacultures of Honduras signed an MOU on prices, quality, and management of Honduran shrimp exports.
President of Argentina Milei plans to restart the Atucha III nuclear power plant, with the negotiations for the $8 billion plant expected to continue through April 2025.
Bolivia and China signed a new trade protocol allowing the Andean country to export 9,000 tons of chia seeds to the country.
The U.S. Labor Department issued a confiscation order (effectively a form of sanctions) against Chinese firm Kingtom Aluminio SRL for abusive labor practices in the Dominican Republic.
A delegation led by the National Tobacco Corporation of China visited Honduras “to explore opportunities to buy tobacco leaves and cigars.”
The Costa Rican government filed a criminal complaint against Costa Rican Electricity Institute (ICE) officials for corrupt dealings with Huawei. The Chinese embassy criticized the country for consulting with the U.S. on its Huawei ban.
Chinese virtual wallet UnionPay just entered the Argentine market through a strategic alliance with Tdkpago.
Taiwan
Four Belizean doctors took part in a training course sponsored by Taiwan’s Ministry of Health & Wellness, while Belize’s government “unveiled a brand-new water well rig truck” that was funded by Taiwan.
Newly leaked messages reveal how then-Panamanian President Varela responded to Taiwan’s displeasure when his country broke ties with the ROC.
On the 90th anniversary of its relationship with the ROC, Guatemala’s foreign minister affirmed his country’s longstanding relationship with Taiwan’s government.
Haiti’s defense minister discussed “new opportunities to modernize the Haitian Armed Forces” and “strengthen national security” with Taiwan’s ambassador.
Taiwan’s National Police Agency gave advanced trainings to 31 St. Lucian police officers.
Society and culture
The PRC donated five drones to the Dominican Republic’s Ministry of Agriculture for “agricultural work at the Bioarroz Experimental Station in Juma, Bonao.”
Ambassador Yu Bo met with Honduran journalists for a Christmas dinner to express “his gratitude for their work in highlighting the strengthening of bilateral relations.”
The University of Brasilia and the Taihe Institute of China held a China-Brazil Forum with government officials, academics, and business officials to discuss issues like rural revitalization, food sovereignty, and digital transformation in agriculture. (CGTN)
In a show of the two country’s growing cultural ties, the Chinese Embassy in Panama sponsored a Chinese lantern festival in Omar Park this month, making it the first Central American country to have such an event.
The mayor of San Francisco de Macorís in the Dominican Republic hosted the Chinese ambassador to inaugurate a “Chinese community area” in the city.
Analysis and Opinion
CSIS issued a new report on China’s four signals intelligence facilities in Cuba and their capabilities.
In response, China denied having any military bases on the island.
Yu Jie and Christopher Sabatini wrote about China’s successful engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean in Foreign Policy.
Coming as Peru’s foreign minister said that Lima will not change its relations with the United States in a Trump administration, Alfredo Thorne writes in Americas Quarterly that while “it [will] be difficult for Peru to avoid favoring China,” “it is difficult to see this continuing in the medium term, [as] aside from its geopolitical position, Peru has little to offer China beyond commodities.”
The New York Times published a piece by Jack Ewing on how Chinese cars are becoming increasingly popular in Mexico.
Earl Bousquet argues in The Voice that “Taiwan’s Caribbean allies will – sooner than later – have to make a decision on how long they’ll continue to sustain their unsustainable ties with Taipei... and from all indications, it’s just a matter of time.
Mexican journalist Julieta Pelcastre argues in Dialogos Americas that “China is expanding its influence in El Salvador, with projects raising concern about their political, economic, and security implications for the region.”
Ryan Berg at CSIS had a new piece on “Ending the Strategic Vacuum: A U.S. Strategy for China in Latin America.”
That’s it for now, see you again in two weeks!
Make sure you don’t miss the next issue of Chaufa 👇
Though in the 20th century the CCP often sought to export its revolutionary model, so far in recent years this appears to have been tamped down a bit. Instead the CCP often publicly suggests that it respects many different political models, though reporting about a party-training school in Tanzania suggests that this both may not be the whole truth and that the CCP may once again seek to export its authoritarian party-state model abroad.
Of course, who knows what happens behind closed doors. More reporting on what actually goes on in these fora is needed to understand whether these events are really just glorified field trips or substantive events that impact a given country’s domestic politics. But public declarations are all we have to analyze, so they should be taken with a grain of salt but it’s better than nothing!
Unfortunately, I was unable to find a declaration from the 2021 forum, so this analysis focuses solely on the first, second, and fourth fora.
It appears while the political party forum is certainly popular, it has plateaued for now.
By my rough count, global governance and international affairs (such as UN cooperation) was the most mentioned issue in the first forum’s declaration, political party capacity was the most important issue in the second declaration, while poverty alleviation and development were clearly the most important issues in the most recent declaration.
Things can always change, so for now, at least.